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Intravention
Abstract
This study examined the dispute-resolution behavior of the " intravenor , " a
distinct third party role in organizational dispute resolution. Unlike a
mediator, whose involvement in the dispute is at the whim of the disputants,
the intravenor can control the outcome of the dispute. Unlike an arbitrator,
who is compelled to dictate the outcome of the dispute, the intravenor may or
may not impose an outcome. The experiment reported here examined the impact
of four variables on third party behavior: The third-party's role (intravenor
versus mediator), the third-party's beliefs about the disputants reaching
agreement (cooperative versus uncooperative disputants), the third party's
self-interest in the outcome, and the third party's concern about the
disputants' outcome (interest in the disputant's mutual welfare). The results
suggest that intravention spawns a distinctive pattern of third party
behavior: Intravenors imposed outcomes in 66% of the cases, but more when
they viewed the disputants as uncooperative than cooperative. Only 44% of the
imposed outcomes reflected the disputants' underlying interests, but this was
greater when the intravenor had high compared to low concern for the
disputants' aspirations. Intravenors were more likely than mediators to use
forceful, pressure tactics, and were more confident and saw themselves as more
influential. Taken together, the results provide the basis for an integrated
model of third-party intervention in organizational dispute resolution.

Intravention
Incravention: Third-Party Incervencion with Clout
Difficult disputes are often resolved with the assistance of a third
party. A growing literature focuses on how the actions of third parties
influence the outcomes of the dispute and the reactions of the disputants (see
Bartunek, Benton & Keys, 1975; Carnevale & Pruitt, 1992; Notz & Starke, 1978;
Pruitt, 1981; Kressel &. Pruitt, 1989; Kolb, 1985). In many cases, the third
party role is temporary and occurs within a preestablished set of rules and
guidelines that specify when intervention will begin and end. The third party
is an outsider to the dispute, meeting with the parties for a brief time and
rarely if ever seeing them again. Examples of outside third parties include
labor mediators and community mediators and arbitrators (Kressel & Pruitt,
1989; Rubin, 1981). In other contexts, however, there is no formally defined
intervention role. The individual who intervenes emerges from a set of actors
who are part of the disputants' organization or system. After the dispute is
resolved, the third party continues to have a relationship with the parties
(see Kressel & Pruitt, 1989, for a discussion of "contractual" and "emergent"
mediation). In some cases, the individual who intervenes has (1)
organizational authority to dictate the outcome of the dispute and (2)
personal interests at stake in the dispute (Rubin, 1981; Walton, 1969).
Murnighan (1986) has called such third parties "intravenors"
.
Mediation and arbitration are the two classic modes of third party
intervention (Pruitt, 1981). Mediators lack decision control (Thibaut &
Walker, 1975): They can suggest solutions, but they cannot impose an
agreement; decision control remains with the disputants. Arbitrators,
however, have decision control: They must provide a settlement which is
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typically binding on both sides. Goldberg and Brett (1990) suggest that
disputants prefer mediation, in part because it allows chem to keep decision
control
.
Analogies of manager-as-mediator and manager-as -arbitrator dominate
discussions of managerial third party intervention. Several scholars (e.g.,
Brett & Goldberg, 1983) suggest that organizations should use mediation.
Others (Notz, Starke & Atwell, 1983; Sheppard, 1984; Kolb & Sheppard, 1985)
argue that managerial mediation is rare. Instead, supervisors use their power
and/or their position to impose solutions, much like arbitrators. Murnighan's
(1986) concept of intravention provides a characterization of the potentially
hybrid role played by organizational third parties. The idea of intravention
also responds to Notz and Starke's (1978) call for a maximally effective third
party procedure, as well as Sheppard' s (1983) call for investigating
innovative dispute resolution procedures. Intravenors can impose a settlement
but have the freedom not to (Conlon, 1988). They may also be influenced by
their own self-interest and the fact that they typically continue as active
members of their organization, as do the disputants.
Decision control and managerial discretion, then, provide key
distinctions among intravention, mediation, and arbitration. Surprisingly,
managerial discretion has received only scattered attention in the
organizational (e.g., Tannenbaum & Schmidt, 1958; Hambrick 6c Finkelstein,
1987) and third party literatures (e.g., McGillicuddy , Welton & Pruitt, 1987;
Conlon & Fasolo, 1990). Although the ability to exert control may appear to
be an advantage for third parties, intravenors' discretion creates a great
deal of uncertainty for them as well as for the disputants.
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At present, no systematic study of intravenor action exists. How and
when intravenors use their decision control are open questions. How and when
they use specific strategies to resolve the dispute- -what they do prior to
exercising their decision control- -are also open questions. In this study, we
compared empirical observations of the behavior of intravenors to the behavior
of mediators in similar situations. Murnighan's (1986) model of intravention
and Carnevale's (1986a) model of mediation provide the theoretical foundations
for this research.
The Concern-Likelihood Model of Mediation
Carnevale's (1986a) concern- likelihood model 1 classifies mediator
behavior into four basic strategies: 1. Problem solving (attempts to foster
integrative, win-win agreements); 2. Compensation (efforts to entice the
parties into concessions or agreements via the promise of rewards and
benefits); 3. Pressure (efforts to force the parties into concessions or
agreements via the threat of punishment or penalties); and 4. Inaction (a
conscious effort to let the parties handle the conflict on their own) . The
model postulates two antecedent variables that interact to predict mediator
behavior; 1. The mediator's likelihood estimate of a win-win agreement
("perceived common ground"); and 2. The mediator's level of concern that the
parties' achieve their aspirations (see Carnevale , 1986a). Perceived common
ground typically arises from evidence of the disputants' cooperativeness
;
concern is defined as a mediator utility function that places positive value
on the parties' collective welfare (see Carnevale, 1986b, for a discussion of
mediator utility functions).
The model predicts that mediators will emphasize: 1. a problem-solving
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strategy aimed at discovering win-win solutions when they have high concern
for the parties' aspirations and perceive that the likelihood of a win-win
agreement is high; 2. compensation to entice the parties into concessions and
agreements when they have high concern for the parties' aspirations and
perceive that the likelihood of a win-win agreement is low; 3. pressure to
force the parties to reduce their aspirations and make concessions when they
have little concern for the parties' aspirations and perceive that the
likelihood of a win-win agreement is low; and 4. inaction, letting the parties
handle the dispute on their own when they have low concern for the parties'
aspirations and perceive that the likelihood of a win-win agreement is high.
Several studies using a laboratory simulation method (Carnevale 6c Conlon,
1988; Carnevale & Henry, 1989; Harris & Carnevale, 1990) found evidence
supporting the concern- likelihood model. In chese studies, subjects served as
mediators, suggested possible settlements in a three- issue negotiation task,
and sent messages (from a preselected list) to simulated negotiators.
Although the results of these studies have been supportive of predictions, the
model is by no means a comprehensive theory of third party action. Murnighan
(1986) made this point, and argued that the "intravenor" third-party role,
typically found in organizational dispute resolution, is associated with a
very different pattern of behavior.
Intravention
Murnighan (1986) argued that in organizational disputes, third parties
often have both the authority to impose agreements and self-interests that
might be affected by the dispute's resolution. Thus, Murnighan postulated two
antecedent variables that interact to predict intravenor behavior: 1. The
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third party's power over che disputants to dictate the outcome, and 2. the
third party's own interests, with the assumption that third parties will
attend to their own interests before the disputants' interests.
Intravenors are predicted to impose decisions to satisfy their own
self-interests. Intravenors rely on two strategies, problem solving and
pressing, for dispute resolution. Problem solving is an attractive strategy
that can satisfy everyone's needs; pressing is particularly attractive to
intravenors because, unlike mediators, they can press the disputants harder by
threatening to impose a settlement. Mediators cannot impose settlements and
are thus less able to act on their self-interest.
Research at a community mediation center (McGillicuddy et al , 1987)
generated results that supported the intravention model. "Mediator-
arbitrators" (mediators who later became arbitrators in the same dispute) were
more forceful than pure mediators, and disputants were less hostile and
competitive and engaged in more problem solving when the third party could
control the outcome.
Research Overview
The concern- likelihood model makes predictions for mediators who have
little or no self-interest and no control over the outcome of the dispute.
Murnighan (1986) argued that intravenors typically threaten to impose
settlements, and will rely almost exclusively on pressure and problem solving
tactics. The key difference between mediation and intravention, according to
Murnighan (1986), is the third party's decision control and incentives: An
intravenor will impose outcomes that primarily reflect their own
self-interest, and will be less affected by the level of concern for the
Intravention
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parties' outcomes or the perceived cooperativeness of the parties.
The present study examined the effects of third party role,
self-interest, concern, and perceived cooperativeness of the disputants
(perceived common ground) . The latter two independent variables derive from
the concern- likelihood model, and thus allow a replication of our previous
research (Carnevale & Henry, 1989; Carnevale 6c Conlon, 1988). 2 Previous tests
of the concern- likelihood model focused on the messages third parties
addressed to disputants as indicators of the third party's strategic choices.
We adopted many aspects of this methodology here, with two important changes.
In previous studies, mediators were forced to select messages from a carefully
constructed and pilot- tested list (e
.
g.
,
. Carnevale & Conlon, 1988). In the
current study, third parties could also formulate and send the disputants any
message they wished. This provided an opportunity to check whether third
parties' communications were constrained by this list of messages. The second
change concerned the manipulation of perceived common ground. In previous
studies, high perceived common ground was manipulated by having the programmed
bargainers' offers converge on an integrative solution. In the present study,
to make the bargaining appear more realistic, the programmed offers under high
perceived common ground moved toward a compromise solution.
Method
Participants and Research Design
Undergraduate business students (N - 222) participated in return for
class credit and a chance at several monetary prizes . Volunteers participated
in group sizes ranging from twelve to thirty. A2x2x2x2 factorial
design varied third party role (intravenor versus mediator), self-interest
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(low versus high), concern for disputants (low versus high) and perceived
common ground (low versus high). Cell frequencies were either 13 or 14.
Procedure
Each participant sat before a personal computer that randomly assigned
the experimental condition, presented the instructions, controlled the
negotiation, and presented the questionnaire. The experimenter and all
assistants were blind to the subjects' assignments. Participants were told
that they would interact with two other subjects in the room via the computer
network. Everyone was then "randomly" assigned the role of Product Manager;
their task was to assist two other managers (the New York and Boston managers)
in settling a dispute. The offers of the New York and Boston managers were
computer programs which disagreed on three issues: The size of transferrable
accounts, length of service in the company before being eligible for
promotion, and promotion criteria. The issues were displayed on the computer
screen in tabular form as in Table 1.
Insert Table 1 about here
Nine different outcomes, labeled "A" through "I", were possible on each
issue. Participants were told that the managers needed to agree on an outcome
for each issue. Points shown next to each possible outcome represented that
outcome's value for each manager. Third parties saw the managers' outcome
tables one after the other --not simultaneously-- and were told that the
disputants would only see their own table. Although not communicated to
participants, the task included integrative tradeoffs among the three issues:
Intravention
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The most valuable issue for che New York manager was the least valuable issue
for the Boston manager, and vice versa. Thus, by trading off these two
issues, the disputants could achieve an integrative, equal-outcome solution
("AEI") with a higher joint payoff (320 points) than the simpler compromise
solution ("EEE" ; 240 points).
The program displayed messages and proposals from each disputant for
eight rounds before interrupting the negotiations. Third parties could send
messages to either or both disputants and suggested settlements to both of
them each round. Prior to every round, participants saw each manager's payoff
table and their own. They were told that the final agreement would determine
the number of lottery tickets they would have in a pool that would determine
whether they, or some other participants in cheir same role, would win one of
five prizes (one of $100; four of $50 each). Instructions emphasized that
their chances of winning increased as the number of their lottery tickets
increased.
Independent Variables
Intravention versus mediation role . Mediators were told that they were
peers of the New York and Boston managers. They were also told that they did
not have the authority to impose outcomes but were free to mediate, make
suggestions, facilitate an agreement, or opt out of the negotiations at any
time. Intravenors were told that the two managers were their subordinates.
They were told that they could impose an outcome if they wished, or they could
mediate, make suggestions, or opt out of the negotiation. Thus, our
operationalization of mediators and intravenors included role differences
(peer vs. boss) and typically concomitant authority differences (power to
Intravention
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suggest vs. power Co impose).
Perceived common ground . When perceived common ground was high, Che
managers (i.e., che computer programs) made relacively large concessions each
round, implying chac chey would ulcimacely agree. The New York managers
proposed "AAA", "BAB", "BBB", "CBB" "CCD" , "DCD" , "DDD" , and "DED" ; che Boscon
managers proposed "III", "HIH" , "HHH" , "HHG" "FGG" , "FGF" , "FFF" , and "FEF".
They were close Co agreemenc afcer eighc rounds. When perceived common ground
was low, che managers made smaller concessions: New York's proposals were
"AAA", "AAA", "ABA", "ABA" "ABA", "ABB", "ABB", and "BBB"; BosCon's were
"III", "III", "IHI", "IHI" "IHI", "HHI", "HHI", and "HHH". They were far from
agreemenc afcer eighc rounds.
Self - inceresc and concern
. Third parcy self - inceresc and concern for che
dispucancs ' aspiracions were manipulaced independencly by varying che outcomes
in che subjeccs' own payoff cables 3 . Wich low self - inceresc and low concern,
che agreemenc between the disputants did not affect their outcome (see Table
2a); reaching any agreement gave them a fixed number of lottery tickets. With
high self-interest and low concern, their outcomes were in direct opposition
to the integrative solution for the two managers. 4 In other words, while
"AEI" provided the highest equal joint outcome for the disputants, it provided
the lowest outcome for the third party. Self-interested third parties
preferred "IEA" (see Table 2b).
With low self-interest and high concern, the payoff table was perfectly
consistent with the integrative solution of the disputants: "AEI" was best for
everyone (see Table 2c). Finally, with both high concern and interest, the
payoffs for the high interest/low concern and low interest/high concern were
Incravencion
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combined, providing the best of the payoffs from Tables 2b and 2c for each
outcome. Thus, the highest third party outcomes were for either "AEI" or
"IEA" (see Table 2d)
.
Insert Table 2 about here
Dependent Variables and Analyses
The computer recorded the third parties' suggested settlements and
messages. If not yet completed, negotiations were interrupted on the eighth
round. Everyone then responded to a questionnaire concerning their
perceptions of the disputants and their own goals. A complete explanation of
the experiment concluded each session.
Results
Suggested settlements made by third parties were divided into five
categories. Proposals that provided each disputant: (1) with exactly 120
points (i.e., the "EEE" solution) were coded as compromises; (2) with more
than 120 points (such as "AEI" or "CEG") as joint benefit; (3) with less than
120 points (such as "IEA" or "GEC") as self-interested. Proposals which
provided one disputant with less than 120 points and the other with more were
coded as (4) favoring Boston or (5) favoring New York.
In addition to suggested settlements, third parties could choose from a
list of provided messages or they could formulate and send their own (see
Table 4). The provided messages were similar to those used in previous
research; several "imposing" (harsh pressing) messages were also included. As
in previous studies (e.g., Carnevale & Conlon, 1988), rounds where the third
Intravention
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party did not send a message were created as "No action" and were combined
with messages that communicated inaction.
The means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations among the
questionnaire measures are shown in Table 3. Ratings of the importance of an
agreement, wanting a good outcome for the managers and for the third party,
the importance of managers getting equal outcomes, and making offers the
bargainers would like were all positively correlated. Also positively
correlated were perceptions of the power of the two managers, the perceived
influence of the third party's messages and proposals, and the managers' needs
for assistance. In general, similar items were correlated and dissimilar
items were not.
Insert Table 3 about here
Manipulation Checks
Analysis of the manipulation checks indicated that the manipulations were
successful [F-ratios (df - 1, 221) exceeded 16.49, p < .001 in each test].
Intravenors felt more powerful than mediators (M = 3.91 vs. 2.30, 5 point
scale), believed that their role was superior to the disputants' (M = 2.69 vs.
2.03, 3 point scale), and that they could impose an outcome (M - 1.96 vs.
1.06, 2 point scale). Third parties in low perceived common ground disputes
believed that the bargainers were less cooperative (M - 3.64 vs. 5.66, 6 point
scale), an agreement was less likely (M => 3.03 vs. 4.22), and more rounds
would be needed before the disputants could reach an agreement (M - 3.68 vs.
2.61)
.
Intravention
14
Since third party levels of concern and self - interest were manipulated by
the payoff tables, the average value of settlements they suggested during the
negotiation acted as a check of these manipulations. Third parties with low
concern suggested settlements of less value to the disputants than third
parties with high concern (M - 242.7 points vs. 262.6 points). Proposals were
also less valuable to the negotiators when third party self-interest was high
(M - 245.9 points vs. 259.1 points). The interest by concern interaction
indicated that the average value of third party proposals decreased in the
following order: (1) high concern with low self-interest (M - 265.4) was
significantly greater than either (2) high concern with high self-interest (M
- 259.7) or (3) low concern with low self-interest (M - 253.0), which were
significantly greater than (4) low concern and high self-interest (M - 232.4),
F(l, 221) - 7.54, p < .007.
Overview of Analyses
A2X2X2X2 multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) examined the
#
main and interaction effects of the four independent variables on the
dependent measures of third party messages, offer proposals, and post-
negotiation perceptions 5
. Significant multivariate effects were found for the
manipulations of third party role, multivariate F(30, 177) = 5.22, p < .001,
interest, multivariate F(30, 177) =- 1.55, p < .04, concern, multivariate F(30,
177) - 2.81, p < .001, and perceived common ground, multivariate F(30, 177) -
2.23, p < .001. An interaction was obcained between third-party role and
perceived common ground, multivariate F(30, 177) = 1.78, p < .01. A priori t-
tests and univariate follow-up tests are reported below.
I
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Content Analysis of Messages Senc to Disputants
Overall message frequencies and the proportion of different messages used
by each participant were tabulated. Self -generated messages were coded as
indicative of one or a combination of the four basic strategies (pressing,
problem solving, compensating, or inaction), of imposing an outcome, or
"miscellaneous." The three authors and a trained assistant independently
classified each message. Over 80% of the messages were unanimously classified
in the same category; this consistency is similar to that achieved by other
coding schemes in the literature (Pruitt, 1981). A brief discussion among the
judges easily resolved the different classifications, which were typically
messages reflecting multiple strategies.
Insert Table 4 about here
An initial analysis revealed significant differences in the use of
provided and self -generated messages, X2 (4) =-69.20, p < .001: Whereas
problem solving was the most frequently used of the provided messages (n =
370, versus 181 for pressing), pressing was the most frequent self -generated
message (n - 100, versus 71 for problem solving). Self -generated messages
expressing compensating (n - 7) and inaction (n - 3) were rare.
Consistent with past research (Carnevale & Henry, 1989; Carnevale &
Conlon, 1988), problem solving (n - 441) and inaction (no message, n - 369,
plus inaction messages, n - 15) messages were most prevalent, followed by
pressing (n - 281), imposing (n = 105), compensating (n - 90), and messages
reflecting both problem solving and pressing (n - 59). Seventeen other
Intravention
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messages combining various strategies were lightly spread across the
conditions and were eliminated from the analysis. The remaining six
categories (pressing, problem solving, compensating, inaction, imposing, and
problem solving-pressing) accounted for over 98 percent of the third parties'
messages (see Table 4)
.
Our evaluation of the impact of the experimental variables on the
messages compared the proportions 6 of problem solving, pressing, compensating,
or no action third party messages in each condition. For the statistical
analyses, imposing messages were incorporated in the pressing category, and
half of the problem solving-pressing messages were added to the problem
solving category, half to pressing. The message proportions in each condition
are reported in Table 5.
Insert Table 5 about here
Tests of the Models' Predictions . The design allows a partial
replication of the concern-likelihood model in the conditions where the third
party was a mediator and had low self-interest (the top quarter of Table 5).
The data were generally consistent with past research (Carnevale & Conlon,
1988; Carnevale & Henry, 1989): Inaction was greatest when there was low
concern and high perceived common ground (prop. - .51 vs. mean prop. - .16 for
the other messages), t(14) =-2.68, p < .02; problem solving was greatest when
there was high concern and high perceived common ground (prop. = .46 vs. mean
prop. -. 18 for the other messages), t(14) = 2.22, p < .05. While pressing
was common when there was low concern and low perceived common ground (prop. -
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.30 vs. mean prop. =- .23 for the other messages), the difference was not
significant. The major deviation from past research was the sparse use of
compensation messages in the high concern, low perceived common ground
condition. 7
The intravention model predicts the frequent use of pressing and problem
solving by third parties. The bottom half of Table 5 shows the proportion of
message use by intravenors . When self-interest was low, intravenor use of
pressing and problem solving was significantly greater than inaction and
compensating (minimum t(14) - 2.93, p < .02) except in the low concern, low
perceived common ground condition, where pressing and problem solving were
more frequent but not significantly so. When self-interest was high, pressing
and problem solving were more frequent when concern was high and perceived
common ground was low (mean prop. = .40 vs. mean prop. -. 10 for the other
messages), t(13) — 6.26, p < .001. When concern and perceived common ground
were both low or both high, pressing and problem solving by intravenors was
very common, but not significantly more than other messages. Only in the low
concern, high perceived common ground condition did self-interested
intravenors fail to press and problem solve a majority of the time, opting
instead for inaction. Note that this condition is exactly when the concern-
likelihood model predicts inaction.
Extending the intravention model predictions into the realm of mediators
(the top half of Table 5), pressing and problem solving were again used a
majority of the time (but not significantly more) in all conditions except
when mediators have low self-interest, low concern, and perceive high common
ground (where inaction was again the dominant choice)
.
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Self-interest and Concern: Effects on Messages and Recommendations
Self-interest had a greater impact on the third parties' suggested
agreements than on their messages. High self-interest, compared to low self-
interest, led to more self-interested suggestions (mean prop. - . 10 vs . mean
prop. - .05), F(l, 206) - 5.53, p < .05, and fewer joint benefit suggestions
(mean prop. - .19 vs. mean prop. - .31), F(l, 206) - 9.34, p < .01.
Concern had an even greater impact. High concern led the third party to
have a longer involvement in the dispute (6.69 rounds versus 5.81 rounds),
F(l, 206) - 8.56, p < .01, to generate fewer self-interested suggestions (mean
prop. - .03 vs. mean prop. - .12), F(l, 206) = 16.15, p < .001, and to make
more joint benefit suggestions (mean prop. =- . 34 vs . mean prop. =- .17), F(l,
206) =24.94, p < .001. High concern also led to more problem solving
messages (mean prop. - .36 vs. mean prop. =» .28), F(l, 206) - 4.94, p < .05,
fewer inaction messages (mean prop. =- .27 vs. mean prop. - .35), F(l, 206) -
4.22, p < .05, and more self -rated concern for a good outcome on the
questionnaire (M - 5.31 vs. 4.80), F(l, 206) = 8.64, p < .01.
Third-party role x perception interactions . The third-party role by
perceived common ground interaction affected three measures (minimum F(l, 206)
- 5.03, p < .03}. Intravenors threatened an imposed outcome more when there
was low rather than high perceived common ground (mean prop. - .15 vs. mean
prop. - .09); mediators threatened an imposed outcome (an empty threat)
rarely, regardless of the perceived common ground condition (mean prop. - .03
and .02). Intravenors' threats corresponded with their satisfaction with the
disputants' progress in the negotiation: They were least satisfied with the
disputants' progress in the low perceived common ground conditions (M - 1.62)
Intravention
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and most satisfied with the disputants' progress in the high perceived common
ground disputes (M - 2.98). The means for the mediators on this measure were
intermediate
.
Roles and perceived common ground also led to an interaction for the
frequency of joint benefit suggestions. Intravenors in the high perceived
common ground condition, who were most satisfied with the parties' progress
and made the least threats to impose an outcome, made fewer joint benefit
suggestions (mean prop. - .19) than when they had perceived low common ground
(mean prop. - .37). Mediators made more joint benefit recommendations when
disputants were already acting cooperatively but were moving toward a
compromise, i.e., when perceived common ground was high (mean prop. - .35 vs.
mean prop . - . 26)
.
Imposed Outcomes
Third parties with intravention power imposed agreements in 72 out of 110
cases (66%). Of the 72 imposed outcomes, more occurred in the low perceived
common ground conditions than in the high perceived common ground conditions
(44 versus 28) . Of the 38 instances where the intravenor decided not to
impose an outcome, 11 were under low perceived common ground, 27 when common
ground was high. The concern and interest variables did not influence the
distribution of imposed or nonimposed outcomes.
Quality of imposed outcomes . Classifying the imposed agreements with the
same coding scheme used for suggested settlements yielded 32 (44%) joint
benefit, 19 (26%) compromise, 8 (11%) self-interested, and thirteen (18%)
imposed agreements that favored one disputant over the other. The former
three imposition types yielded several systematic effects: Joint benefit
Intravention
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impositions occurred more when third party concern was high (25 of 32), and
when perceived common ground was low (26 of 32). Self-interested impositions
(7 of 8) and compromises (15 of 19) were most often imposed when the
intravenor had low concern. The only interaction indicated chat joint benefit
solutions were imposed most in the high concern, low perceived common ground
conditions (19 of 32) , and never in che low concern, high perceived common
ground conditions
.
Timing of imposed outcomes . The imposed agreements occurred at about
equal intervals across the eight rounds of negotiation. Of the 72
impositions, their frequency across rounds was (beginning with Round 1) 7, 11,
9, 11, 10, 5, 12, and 7. Concern was che only faccor Co significantly
influence the timing of impositions: When intravenors had low concern for che
parcies' outcomes, they imposed outcomes earlier (M =- 3.86) than when chey had
high concern (M - 4.95), F(l,71) - 4.31, p < .05.
Timing and quality of imposed outcomes
. Early impositions, defined as
those that occurred on Rounds 1 through 4 (n = 38) , were compared to late
impositions, defined as those that occurred on Rounds 5 through 8 (n - 34).
Compromise and self-interested impositions occurred early (32% vs. 21% for
compromise; 16% vs. 6% for self - interested)
;
joint-benefit outcomes were
imposed later (37% vs 57%). The longer che incravenor waiced before imposing
an outcome, the more likely the outcome reflected the underlying interests of
the disputants
.
Intravenor Versus Mediator Role, and Perceived Common Ground
Consistent with our expectations, the ability to impose an agreement
reduced perceived common ground: Incravenors felt that an agreement was less
Intravention
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likely (M - 3.33 vs. 3.90, 6 poinc scale) and chat the disputants would need
more rounds to reach agreement IM =- 3.32 vs. 2.98, 5 point scale; F-ratios (df
- 1. 221) exceeded 16.49, p < .001 in both cases). Other measures indicated
important behavioral and perceptual differences between mediators and
intravenors (see Table 6) . Possibly as a result of reduced common ground,
intravenors ended their involvement in the negotiation (either by imposing
settlements or opting to leave the negotiation) more quickly than mediators,
and repeated their proposals more than mediators. Intravenors sent fewer
compromise suggestions, and more pressing and imposing messages than
mediators .
Insert Table 6 about here
In their questionnaire responses, intravenors felt that an agreement was
more important than mediators, and that both managers needed their assistance
more. Intravenors expressed greater self-confidence and were more willing to
be involved in future negotiations with the two managers. Intravenors'
enhanced confidence was also evident in their perceptions that their proposals
were more influential than the mediators', their messages were more
influential, and they were more satisfied with what they could do in the
negotiation. Compared to mediators, then, intravenors perceived the situation
as more severe, yet they were more confident in their intervention effort.
High perceived common ground, compared to low perceived common ground,
produced more self-interested suggestions and more problem solving messages,
along with fewer pressing and imposing messages. From questionnaire measures,
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low perceived common ground led Co chird party beliefs chat the two managers
needed more assistance, less satisfaction with the actions of the disputants,
and less satisfaction with the progress chey had made in negotiations. In
addition, when there was low perceived common ground, the chird parties in
general believed that their proposals were less influential, and were less
satisfied with their role in the negotiation.
Discussion
The data from this study are clear: Intravenors -- third parties who can
impose an outcome if they wish- -displayed a distinctive pattern of dispute
resolution behavior. They were more likely to use forceful, pressure tactics,
were less likely to see that the disputants could reach an agreement on their
own, were more self-confident, and were more likely than not to impose an
outcome. Intravenors clearly matched Kolb and Sheppard's (1985)
conceptualization of organizational third parties who use their power. They
were not ruthless, however: They were most likely to impose outcomes that
were beneficial to the disputants, especially when chey were concerned about
the disputants, when they believed that the disputants would not reach
agreement by themselves, or when the negotiation had continued for at least
five rounds. The intravention model thus represents an important addition to
the literature on third parties. Prior to this research, mediation and
intravention were models of third-party intervention that rested on unique
assumptions about operating conditions and characteristics.
An Integrated Model of Organizational Dispute Resolution
The results of this study suggest an integrated model of third party
intervention that encompasses both mediation and intravention roles. The
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integrated model is derived from two patterns that were observed in the data
of this study: 1. Third party inaction when it appears that the disputants can
handle the conflict on their own, and 2. Considerable action (e.g., imposed
outcomes) when inputs are available and/or potentially helpful. These
patterns suggest a time-based model where third parties become more active as
a dispute continues (cf. Kressel, 1972). In addition, forces that increase a
third party's involvement ( intravention power, self-interest, concern in the
absence of self-interest, and low perceived common ground) should also
increase action. These action/inaction concepts can be used to develop a
model of third party action (see Figure 1) that accounts for much of the data
in this study. In addition, as the four independent variables of this study
all affected the third party's involvement, they are also incorporated in the
model
.
Two structural elements, the power of the third party and perceived
common ground, had consistently strong effects in this study. Strategically,
t
third parties were less active when perceived common ground was high. In
addition, they proposed relatively poor agreements for the disputants when
perceived common ground was high and they had intravention power. Low
perceived common ground, on the other hand, led to more problem solving and
pressing, sometimes in the same message. Indeed, problem solving-pressing
messages were effective double-barrels: Disputants needed to move toward each
other, and, in some sense, reciprocate the third party's efforts (which, being
problem solving, should have been perceived as sincere).
Thus, the relationship between the third party and the disputants, and
the effect of this relationship on perceptions of common ground, are important
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initial elements in our integrated model. Mediators' behaviors are
constrained by their relationship with che disputants and/or a lack of
decision control. Their action also depends on the relative importance of
self-interest and concern: Concern for che disputants should dominate
self-interest for mediators. If self-interest prevails, mediators may try to
take control of the process and even act like they have intravention power.
Kolb (1985), for instance, cogently discusses the intangible power mediators
try to establish for themselves during the process. If concern for the
disputants dominates, then third parties have additional incentives to problem
solve, especially when perceived common ground is low and when compensation is
not possible.
When third parties are intravenors , self-interest can be overtly
expressed; the third party's clout makes self-interested agreements more
probable. Intravenors may temper their dominance and act like mediators,
however, if they have little self-interest or if chey are seriously concerned
about the disputants' outcomes. This concern could, for example, result from
a positive correlation between favorable outcomes for the subordinates (i.e.,
the disputants) and for the superior (i.e., the intravenor) . This establishes
an interesting comparison between self-interested mediators who will try to
establish decision control, and less self-interested intravenors who may
relinquish this control. How the disputants respond to such shifts in the
structure of the third party's role will be an important determinant of the
dispute's outcome and an obvious topic for future research.
Although forces may push for the hegemony of self-interest over concern,
one set of forces is likely to predominate. In this study, the surprising
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infrequency of self - interested impositions indicates that concern may have won
out over self-interest. In organizational contexts, concern may also dominate
self-interest when a settlement's consequences are not critical to the third
party's long range goals. Disputes over the process of reaching a short term
goal, for example, may be unimportant to the third party as long as the goal
is attained. Should the dispute involve goals or outcomes relating to the
department's or the organization's overall effectiveness or mission, however,
the third party's self-interest may dominate any concern for the disputants.
A study of self-interest in disputes with potentially variable consequences
would be particularly illuminating.
Thus, we posit that three sees of determinants, along with the simple but
compelling effects of time, drive a third party's involvement and action in a
dispute (Figure 1) : (1) whether the third party has mediation or intravention
power; (2) whether progress toward agreement (perceived common ground) reduces
the need for the third party to intervene; and (3) whether self-interest
dominates the third party's concern for the disputants. The long term
consequences of the dispute's potential resolution, as perceived by the third
party, should directly influence the last of these sets of determinants.
Perceived consequences, then, become an additional element in the model.
Mediators act in ways that will reflect well on them. Intravenors have more
scope: They will be reluctant to let disputants reach an agreement that
threatens their own interests, even if those interests are only indirectly
related to the dispute. The consequences to the third party, then, may work
in much the same way as perceived common ground: When perceived common ground
is low and/or consequences are dangerous, third parties should be very active.
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When perceived common ground is high and/or consequences are unimportant, less
action is necessary.
Insert Figure 1 about here
This integrated model incorporates structural and interpersonal factors
within the context of a dif ferentiable dispute environment and predicts how
active a third party's conflict resolution strategies are likely to be. It
identifies when bosses or peers are most likely to get involved as third
parties and when power and self-interest will dominate. Clearly, we would
like to see its implications tested.
Many issues concerning the disputants and their reactions remain open
questions. Three (of many) immediate questions include: (1) Will disputants
react negatively to settlements imposed by intravenors , even when they are
favorable, simply because they resent having the decision made for them (cf
.
,
Castore & Murnighan, 1978; Conlon & Fasolo, 1990)? (2) When will intravenors
act like mediators (and only make suggestions) and how can they effectively
implement their strategic choices? (3) Is hierarchical authority or decision
control (or both) responsible for the many differences observed between
mediators and intravenors? Efforts are also necessary to determine the
organizational antecedents of intravenor behavior and the consequences of
intravenor decisions for organizational members. We hope that the present
findings have provided a basis for further theoretical and empirical
developments that may eventually offer the possibility of a more comprehensive
model of organizational conflict resolution.
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Footnotes
1. The concern- likelihood model was previously called the strategic choice
model of mediation (e.g., Carnevale , 1986a).
2. In past studies of the concern- likelihood model, the mediator's concern
for the disputants' aspirations was operationalized in a rather complex
fashion (Carnevale & Henry, 1989; Carnevale & Conlon, 1988): In the high
concern conditions, the mediator was told that (a) both disputants were highly
regarded members of the organization, (b) the disputants would evaluate the
mediator's performance, and (c) they would meet with both disputants after the
negotiation. In low concern conditions, the disputants were portrayed as
laggard, there was no mention of an evaluation, and no mention of meeting them
afterwards. In the present study, we implemented concern for the disputants'
directly by the payoffs: In the high concern conditions, the mediators'
outcomes were positively correlated with the joint outcome of the disputants;
in low concern, there was a zero correlation.
»
3. Self-interest, like the concern independent variable, was also implemented
via payoffs: In the high self-interest conditions, the third parties'
outcomes were negatively correlated with the joint outcome of the disputants;
in low self-interest, there was a zero correlation. Thus, both third party
concern and self-interest are seen as independent conditions derived from the
third party's incentives.
4. It may seem curious that a third party with interests opposed to one or
both disputants is involved in a dispute not as another player, but as a
mediator or intravenor. It should be noted that, at least in international
conflicts, that this is not uncommon (cf. Zartman & Touval , 1985), and it has
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been argued that these kinds of interests also play a role in organizational
disputes (Carnevale, 1986b).
5. The message and offer proportions were subjected to arc-sine
transformations prior to analysis (Winer, 1971).
6. Frequency data allows third parties who communicated on more rounds to
exert a greater impact on the character of the data. Proportional data gives
equal weight to each third party's messages. The differences between them
were negligible. Thus, results that follow focus on mean proportions of
messages sent by the third parties.
7. Past studies (Carnevale &. Henry, 1989; Carnevale 6c Conlon, 1988) showed
that compensation was not uncommon. The scenario used in this research
provided little impetus for a third party to consider compensation. Also, the
overall frequency of compensation may not indicate its importance, as only one
instance of compensation may have the intended effect and resolve the conflict
(cf. Touval & Zartraan, 1985).
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» Table 1
i
The Issue/Pavoff Tables for the New York and Boston Managers
NEW YORK MANAGER'S PAYOFF TABLE
Cut-Off Money Number of Years Promotion
120 A 80 A 40 A
105 B 70 B 35 B
90 C 60 C 30 C
75 D 50 D 25 D
60 E 40 E 20 E
45 F 30 F 15 F
30 G 20 G 10 G
15 H 10 H 5 H
1 1 1
BOSTON MANAGER'S PAYOFF TABLE
Cut-Off Money Number of Years P-romotion
A A A
5 3 10 B 15 B
10 C 20 C 30 C
15 D 30 D 45 D
20 E 40 E 60 E
25 F 50 F 75 F
30 G 60 G 90 G
35 H 70 H 105 H
40 I 80 I 120 1
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Table 2
Third Party Issue/Pavoff Tables as a Function of Self - Interest and Concern
(A) Low Self -Interest , No Concern (B) High Self - Interest , No Concern
PromotionCut-Off Number Promotion
Money of years
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
(C) Low Interest, High Concern
Cut-Off Number Promotion
Money of years
120 A 40 A A
105 B 40 B 15 B
90 C 40 C 30 C
75 D 40 D 45 D
60 E 40 E 60 E
45 F 40 F 75 F
30 G 40 G 90 G
15 H 40 H 105 H
I 40 I 120 I
Cut-Off
Money
A
15 B
30 C
Number
of Years
40 A
40 B
40 C
120 A
105 B
90 C
45 D 40 D 75 D
60 E 40 E 60 E
75 F 40 F 45 F
90 G 40 G 30 G
105 H
120 I
40 H
40 I
15 H
I
(D) High Self - Interest , High Concern
Cut-Off Number Promotion
Monev of Years
120 A ' 40 A 120 A
105 B 40 3 105 B
90 C 40 C 90 C
75 D 40 D 75 D
60 E 40 E 60 E
75 F 40 F 75 F
90 G 40 G 90 G
105 H
120 I
40 H
40 I
105 H
120 I
Note: Although subjects in the low self-interest, low concern condition saw a
table of zeros, they were told that they would receive a fixed amount of
lottery tickets for prizes if any agreement was reached.
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Table 3
Me ans. Standard Deviations, ^nd Intercorrelations Amonn Questionnaire Measures m MANOVA
T; a s u r <? Mean SD 1 2 3 < 5 6 7 3 9 10 1 1 12 13 14 15 16 17 1!
'
t. Important to
I
reach agreement 4.74 1.36
2. Want managers to
get good outcome 4.49 1.29 49
3. Third party
wants good outcome S.05 1.30 37 52
4. Power of NY
Manager 2.59 0.81 06 28 19
5. Power of Boston
Manager 2.41 0.78 02 28 14 73
6. Willingness
to be in future
negotiations
between managers 2.34 0.94 17 18 14 16 10
7. Prefer NY
over Boston 3.00 0.57 01 06 08 01 02 06
3. My proposals
were influential 2.00 0.86 05 11 02 06 03 30 15
9. My messages
were influential 1.34 0.84 08 05 -00 06 02 24 13 58
10. Satisfied
with progress of
disputants toward
agreement 2.42 1.40 -06 12 -02 14 12 24 07 44 28
11. Important to
give managers equal
outcomes 4.70 1.35 34 32 27 03 06 11 04 22 20 11
12. Dissatisfied
with discretion
available 3.60 1.56 -07 -02 -03 03 05 -19 -02 -20 -13 -20 -08
13. NY Manager '
needs assistance 2.67 1.12 20 17 14 03 -04 24 -03 32 23 -04 19 -04
14. Boston Manger
needs assistance 2.72 1.13 17 16 15 09 -10 22 09 31 29 -02 20 -05 88
15. Want Boston to
do better than NY 2.71 0.67 08 08 07 -05 09 10 10 07 09 04 15 02 11 09
16. Self-
confidence 2.99 1.11 22 21 26 01 -01 26 10 20 14 03 31 -20 29 31 15
17. Control over
negotiations 1.95 1.72 05 06 09 07 12 24 -00 23 18 06 05 -23 20 18 11 22
I
18. Dissatisfied
ith actions of
isputants 3.44 1.44 -00 -06 -02 -04 -06 -27 02 -29 -17 -42 -05 45 -09 -09 01 -23 -23
9. Trying to make
ffers bargainers
ill like 4.32 1.33 32 44 31 31 29 24 09 20 15 10 43 00 30 31 17 28 12 -03
I'ote. Decimal points omitted. Correlations greater than or equal to .13 are significant at p < .05. Items 9-10 are 4 pa
scales. Items 4-7 and 13-17 are 5 point scales. All others are 6 point scales.
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Table 4
Examples of Messages Selected or Created bv the Third Parries
Pressing
You are too stubborn -- you had better make more concessions.
Dropping down one letter won't do it!
Problem Solving
Let's find a creative solution that makes everyone happy.
Instead of taking a competitive stance, we should try to seek a
coordinated solution.
Compensating
If you agree, I will transfer some new accounts to your region.
Agree and if I win I'll give you some of my money.
Inaction
I think that you should work this out yourselves.'
No message.
Imposing
If you don't settle this soon, I will settle it for you.
Give on promotion or I will force your hand and screw you.
Pressing and Problem Solving
At AEI you both receive a good outcome! Stop being so stubborn and accept this!
Note. With the exception of the last category, the first message in each category
is an example of a message provided to the third parties. The second message in
each condition is an example of a message generated by the third parties. All
"pressing and problem solving" messages were generated by third parties.
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Table 5
Means and Standard Deviations (in Parentheses) of Messages
Used as a Function of Role (Mediator Versus Intravenor). Perceived
Common Ground (PCG), Concern, and Interest .
Low PCG
Pressing .26 (.27)
Low Problem Solving .31 (.21)
Concern Compensating .14 (.20)
Low Inaction .25 (.30)
Self-interest, Imposing .03 (.05)
Mediator Pressing & Problem Solving .02 (.05)
Pressing
High Problem Solving
Concern Compensating
Inaction
Imposing
Pressing & Problem Solving
High PCG
13 (.17)
23 (.21)
03 (.07)
51 (.32)
05 (.10)
05 (.11)
.17 (.15) .12 (.18)
.38 (.22) .44 (.29)
.04 (.08) .03 (.06)
.37 (.25) .35 (.38)
.02 (.08) .02 (.05)
.02 (.05) .04 (.07)
Pressing .17 ( 16)
Low Problem Solving .25 ( 19)
Concern Compensating .08 ( 16)
High Inaction .34 ( 30)
Self -Interest
,
Imposing .03 ( 07)
Mediator Pressing & Problem Solving .13 ( .28)
Pressing
High Problem Solving
Concern Compensating
Inaction
Imposing
Pressing & Problem Solving
19 ( 17)
35 ( 28)
11 ( .22)
27 ( .28)
05 ( • 12)
04 ( .09)
.15 (.16) .15 (.11)
.36 (.29) .38 (.24)
.07 (.12) .09 (.18)
.28 (.35) .36 (.28)
.02 (.05) .00 (.00)
.11 (.21) .02 (.09)
Table 5 (continued)
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Low PCG High PCG
Pressing .17 (.18) .23 (.23)
Low Problem Solving .30 (.30) .40 (.31)
Concern Compensating .00 (.00) .00 (.00)
Low Inaction .39 (.33) .23 (.28)
Self- Interest
,
Imposing .12 (.15) .12 (.12)
Intravenor Pressing & Problem Solving .02 (.05) .02 (.05)
Pressing .26 (.15) .25 (.30)
High Problem Solving .21 (.15) .42 (.27)
Concern Compensating .12 (.15) .10 (.10)
Inaction .15 (.14) .15 (.14)
Imposing .22 (.14) .06 (.09)
Pressing & Problem Sol-ying .05 (.10) .02 (.05)
Pressing .38 (.34) .10 (.12)
Low Problem Solving .16 (.19) .20 (.23)
Concern Compensating .07 (.16) .01 (.04)
High Inaction .26 (.37) . 57 (.37)
Self- Interest
,
Imposing .13 (.20) .06 (.10)
Intravenor Pressing & Problem Sol </ing .00 (.00) .06 (.15)
Pressing
/
31 (.17) .08 (.11)
High Problem Solving 32 (.18) .38 (.34)
Concern Compensating 04 (.08) .07 (.13)
Inaction 16 (.17) .34 (.36)
Imposing 13 (.13) .10 (.10)
Pressing & Problem Solving 05 (.08) .03 (.07)
I
Note. Means in Table refer to mean proportions of messages used
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